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The European Commission’s Rule of Law Report 2020, in its Spanish chapter,
highlights in particular the situation of the Judicial Council as a challenge: The
mandate of its members has expired in December 2018, but its new members
have not yet been appointed. To unblock this situation a proposal was introduced
in Parliament, but the envisaged reform does not comply with EU standards and
endangers judicial independence, as the European Commission and GRECO have
warned. Some days afterwards the President of the Government has announced that
he wants to stop this reform, although it has not yet been formarly withdrawn.
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established a Council of the Judiciary that consists
of the President of the Supreme Court and twenty members. Twelve of the members
must be appointed among judges, but the Constitution did not explain who should
elect these members and by which procedure and majority. It simply referred
these questions to an organic law. The eight other members are appointed among
lawyers or other jurists of recognized competence with more than fifteen years of
professional practice. But here the Constitution clearly established that four of those
are elected by the lower Chamber of Parliament (“Congreso”) by a 3/5 majority and
the other four by the Senate by a 3/5 majority as well.
Only in 1980 the twelve judicial members of the Council where directly elected
by their peers. In 1985 the organic law was changed and all the 20 members
were elected by the Parliament by 3/5 majority. In its judgement 108/1986 the
Constitutional Court recalled that the twelve judicial members should not only
represent the different levels of experience in the Judiciary, according to their
professional background and age, but also the different ideological trends.
Nevertheless the Constitution does not establish a fixed procedure of appointment
of these members of the Council. Quite the contrary: it refers this question to an
organic law which requires an absolute majority to be enacted. According to the
Constitutional Court, the 3/5 majority established by the organic law in 1985 was a
qualified majority and, as such, sufficient guarantee. The Court, however, already
warned about the danger that the Parliament could use this power to distribute the
seats in the Council along the political forces in Parliament. This could be acceptable
in other fields but not in the field of the Judiciary, which has to be kept at distance
from the fights among political parties. In its judgement 191/2016 the Constitutional
Court reiterated once again that the Council is not a representative institution, but an
institution to guarantee judicial independence.
Reforms and gridlocks
The system of appointment of the twelve judicial members has undergone different
reforms. The reform of 2013 established the nomination of candidates by either a
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judicial association or 25 acting judges, obliging the Parliament to appoint the judicial
members of the Council among these candidates.
Last October 13th the two parliamentary groups supporting the Spanish
Government, the socialist “PSOE” and the left-wing “Unidas Podemos – En Comú
Podem – Galicia en Común”, introduced a draft piece of legislation in Parliament,
changing the system of appointment of the judicial members of the Council. This
would allow their election by absolute majority, if the 3/5 majority is not reached in
the first round. The draft law also aims to restrict the powers of the Council in an
interim situation: As long as the political parties have not reached an agreement on
the renewal of the Council, the current law foresees that the Council remains fully
functional until the new one is elected. The only election that is not possible for a
Council exercising its powers ad interim is to elect a new President of the Council.
European standards
Leaving aside internal considerations from a constitutional point of view: what seems
clear is that the draft legislation violates the European standards in various ways.
First, it does not comply with the expectation that the judicial members of the
Council have to be directly elected by their peers. In its Recommendation CM/Rec
(2010) 12, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe clearly states that
“not less than half of the members of such Councils should be judges chosen by
their peers from all levels of the judiciary and with respect to pluralism inside the
Judiciary”. The European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) in its report
2010-2011 on Councils for the Judiciary established several principles on how
these Councils should be organized, among them the requisite that a majority of the
judicial members must be elected by their peers. Therefore the Venice Commission
has several times recalled its position expressed in the Rule of Law Checklist, in the
Report of the Judicial Appointments and in the Report on the Independence of the
Judicial System (Part I: The Independence of Judges) to the effect that “a substantial
element or a majority of the members of the Judicial Council should be elected by
the Judiciary itself”. As the European Commission has stated in its Recommendation
2018/103, “it is up to the Member States to organise their justice systems, including
whether or not to establish a Council of the Judiciary. However, where such a
Council has been established, […] its independence must be guaranteed in line with
European standards” (paragraph 31). According to a recent survey conducted under
acting judges in Spain, 90% of them prefer the election of the judicial members of the
Council by their peers.
Second, the lowering of the majority required for the parliamentary election from
3/5 to absolute majority in a second round threatens to politicize the appointment of
the judicial members of the Council, and hence the Council as such, as the Venice
Commission and the European Commission have highlighted in their reports on the
Polish reform of the Council for the Judiciary.
And last but not least, the proposal of draft legislation has not been submitted to
the opinion of the Council of the Judiciary, in breach of the European standards
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that require that “all draft texts relating to the status of judges, the administration
of justice, procedural law and more generally, all draft legislation likely to have
an impact on the judiciary, e.g. the independence of the judiciary, or which might
diminish citizens’ (including judges’ own) guarantee of access to justice, should
require the opinion of the Council of the Judiciary before deliberation by Parliament.
This consultative function should be recognised by all States and affirmed by the
Council of Europe as a recommendation” (Opinion 10 (2007) of the Consultative
Council of European Judges on the Council for the Judiciary at the service of
society). In the same line the ENCJ in its report 2010-2011 on Councils for the
Judiciary points out that “the Council should have the power to put forward proposals
or to render opinions on any judicial policies or legislative proposals which impact on
the delivery of justice or the functions of the judiciary.”
 According to the Principles on Judicial Ethics adopted by the Spanish Judiciary in
2016, when democracy, the Rule of Law and fundamental freedoms are in danger,
the obligation of secrecy is relinquished in favour of the duty to speak out. In that
sense five regional courts in Spain have publicly rejected the proposal, and so did
the main judicial associations and the European Association of Judges. Now is the
time to speak up.
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